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Abstract— This paper focuses on the problem of controlling
self-interested drivers in ride-sourcing applications. Each driver
has the objective of maximizing its profit, while the ride-
sourcing company focuses on customer experience by seeking to
minimizing the expected wait time for pick-up. These objectives
are not usually aligned, and the company has no direct control
on the waiting locations of the drivers. In this paper, we provide
two indirect control methods to optimize the set of waiting
locations of the drivers, thereby minimizing the expected wait
time of the customers: 1) sharing the location of all drivers with
a subset of drivers, and 2) paying the drivers to relocate. We
show that finding the optimal control for each method is NP-
hard and we provide algorithms to find near-optimal control in
each case. We evaluate the performance of the proposed control
methods on real-world data and show that we can achieve
between 20% to 80% improvement in the expected response.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, ride-sourcing services such as UberX and
Lyft have emerged as an alternative mode of urban trans-
portation. The reduced wait times for pickup of these services
is the compelling feature compared to the conventional taxi
services [1]. A key factor that affects the response time of the
service is where the drivers wait to respond to the next ride
request. Ride-sourcing companies do not have control over
the position of the drivers as they are self-interested units
maximizing their objectives. Therefore, a challenge is to
ensure the drivers are distributed throughout the city in order
to minimize the expected wait time of the customers. This
must be done either by providing information to drivers, or
through incentives (payment) that make relocation attractive.
As a method for both re-balancing and increasing the
supply of drivers, Uber introduced surge pricing in high
demand areas. This reduces the expected response time of
servicing the requests by drawing more drivers to those areas.
However, the surge pricing can draw drivers away from lower
demand areas, resulting in higher wait times in those areas
and more imbalance [2], [3].
The problem of servicing requests in ride-sourcing net-
works can be divided into two major problems: 1) assignment
of the ride request to the drivers; and 2) re-balancing of the
drivers for future ride requests. In this paper, we focus on
the re-balancing problem for a subset of drivers to service
ride requests that arrive sequentially in an environment. The
drivers’ motion in the environment is captured as a road-
map (i.e., graph), and each ride request arrives at a node of
the graph according to a known arrival rate (see Figure 1).
The drivers are self-interested units maximizing the expected
profit of their workday. Hence, the ride-sourcing company
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Fig. 1: A set of drivers in the ride-sourcing system and a set of
locations with high probability of ride request arrival.
has no direct control over the waiting locations of the drivers.
The objective of the ride-sourcing company is to incentivize
the drivers to relocate to a set of waiting locations that
minimizes the expected wait-time of the customers.
Related Work: The problem of dispatching taxis to service
ride requests arriving sequentially over time has been the
subject of extensive research [4], [5], [6], [7]. These studies
focus on policies to optimally assign the ride requests to
the taxis. In contrast, we focus on the waiting locations
of the drivers that minimize the expected wait time of the
customers. We assume the ride requests are assigned in a
first-come-first-serve fashion to the closest available driver.
Assigning the closest available driver to each request is
the common method employed by the ride-sourcing com-
panies [8].
The problem of re-balancing service units in the environ-
ment has been studied for various applications. In mobility-
on-demand problem (MOD) [9], [10], [11], a group of
vehicles are located at a set of stations. The customers arrive
at the stations, hire the vehicles for ride, and then drop
the vehicles off at their destination stations. The objective
is to balance the vehicles at the stations to minimize the
expected wait time of the customer. In comparison to MOD,
we consider the customer wait-time as the time between
the request arrival and the pick-up time, which incorporates
the distance of the closest available vehicle to the pick-up
location.
The facility location problem [12], [13] and its extension
to the mobile facility location problem (MFL) [14] is the
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
04
61
5v
1 
 [c
s.M
A]
  1
0 S
ep
 20
19
problem of distributing facilities in a set of locations to
respond to the demands arriving at different locations. The
objective is to minimize the time to respond to the demands
and the total cost of opening facilities. A special case of
the facility location problem is the k-median problem [13]
where the number of open facilities is limited and the
cost of opening a facility is zero. In [15], we addressed
a multi-stage MFL problem where we relocate a set of
autonomous vehicles to minimize expected response time for
future requests in a receding horizon manner.
In the aforementioned studies, the actions of service units
are controlled by a central unit and the objective of the
service units is aligned with the global objective. However,
we consider self-interested units maximizing their own profit
such that the ride-sourcing companies have no direct control
on their decisions. A closely related problem is that of
Voronoi games on graphs [16] where requests arrive on the
vertices of a graph and the objective of each self-interested
service unit is to maximize the number vertices assigned
to them. They cast the problem as a game between the
service units prove that the problem of finding the pure
Nash equilibrium on general graphs is NP-hard. In [17], the
authors provide the best response strategy for each driver and
they approximate Nash equilibria, which can be utilized by
the ride-sourcing companies to incentivize the drivers in a
way to maximizes a global objective. These studies focus on
the strategies of the self-interested service units, in contrast,
we focus on finding the optimal policy for the ride-sourcing
company to optimally respond to the ride requests.
Contributions: The contributions of this paper are three-
fold. First, we formulate the re-balancing problem of self-
interested service units. Second, we propose two indirect
method to relocate the service units to minimize the expected
response time and provide algorithms with near-optimal
solutions. Third and finally, we evaluate the performance
of the two proposed control methods on real-world ride-
sourcing data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we for-
mulate the problem of minimizing customer wait-time with
self-interested service units. In Section III, we provide the
first indirect control method based on sharing the information
on the location of the drivers. Section IV.I consists of the
second control method based on incentive pay for the drivers
to relocate to desired waiting locations. Finally in Section V,
we provide an extensive set of experiments, on real-world
ride-sourcing data, characterizing the performance of the two
control methods.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a set of m drivers and a set of pick-up and drop-
off locations V . Let G = (V,E, c) be a metric graph on
vertices V , let E be the set of edges between the locations
and c : E → R+ be the function assigning a travel time to
each edge of the graph. The drivers wait on a subset of the
vertices for the next request, which we call the configuration
of the drivers Q. The set of all configurations of the drivers
is denoted by Q. Each driver i is aware of the position of a
subset of the drivers Ii ⊆ Q, for instance, each driver may
be aware of the location of the other drivers in its vicinity.
We assume that the requests arrive at each vertex u
according to an independent Poisson process with arrival
rate λu. Upon a request arrival, the closest driver to the
vertex of the request is assigned to service the request.
Let pa(u) denote the arrival probability, which is the ratio
of number of requests arriving at u to the total number
of requests arriving in a period of time. Let the drop-off
probability pd(dropoff = w|pickup = v) be the probability
that a request with pickup location at vertex v has a drop-off
location at vertex w.
Driver i’s perception of her expected profit is a function
of her information Ii on the location of other drivers,
environment parameters such as arrival times, her waiting
location qi and the period of working time Bi, denoted by
Vi(u,Bi). For the development of our main control methods
we do not assume any specific form of this function. We do
assume, however, that the ride-sourcing company has access
to this function, obtained through data of driver behavior.
In Section V we present one potential model of Vi(u,Bi),
which is then used for simulating the two control methods.
Drivers’ objective: Each driver is a self-interested unit,
therefore, they will wait at a location that maximizes their
expected profit, i.e.,
arg max
u∈V
−σc(qi, u) + Vi(u,Bi − c(qi, u)), (1)
where σ is the cost per minute of driving.
Global objective: In addition to the objective of each
driver, there is a global objective for the service providers
such as Uber and Lyft to maximize the service quality by
minimizing the expected wait time of the customers until
pick-up, i.e.,
min
Q∈Q
D(Q) =
∑
u∈V
min
qi∈Q
pa(u)c(qi, u), (2)
The main challenge in optimizing the global objective
is that the drivers are self-interested units and the service
provider does not have any direct control on the configuration
of the vehicles. Therefore, the service provider is not able
to minimize the expected response time to the requests
directly. The two indirect control methods proposed in this
paper incentivize the drivers to relocate to desired waiting
locations. The first control method exploits the dependency
of the expected profit of the drivers on their information
Ii. The service provider can share more information on the
location of drivers with a subset of them to manipulate their
decision towards relocating to a desired waiting location. We
refer to this as the sharing information control method. The
second proposed control method, incentivizes the drivers to
relocate to desired waiting locations with payments, which
we refer to as the pay-to-control method. These control
methods are applicable to various models of driver behaviour
V .
In the following sections, we provide a detailed description
of the two control methods and propose algorithms to find
near optimal controls.
(a) Equal information sharing (b) Partial information sharing
Fig. 2: Instance of ride-sourcing problem with two vehicles and two
request arrival locations.
III. CONTROL BY SHARING INFORMATION
In this section, we provide an indirect control on the
configuration of the drivers exploiting the fact that the
optimal waiting location for each driver in Equation (1) is a
function of the information provided to the driver regarding
the position of the other drivers, i.e., Ii.
Figure 2 demonstrates the importance of information on an
instance of the ride-sourcing problem with two vehicles and
two request locations. The locations are within unit distance
apart and the arrival rate at locations v1 and v2 are 0.1
and 0.2, respectively. The vehicles are initially located at
v1 and will relocate to the best waiting location, namely
optimizing Equation (1). Figure 2a shows the two scenarios
where both vehicles are provided the same information, i.e.,
I1 = I2 = ∅ and I1 = I2 = Q. Note that the configuration
of the vehicles when they are provided the same information
is the worst possible configuration for the global objective.
However, illustrated in Figure 2b, providing the information
to a subset of the vehicles results in the optimal configuration
for the global objective.
The information sharing problem consists of deciding
the subset of drivers we share information with and the
information shared with each driver. However, for this work,
we consider the binary decision where either full information
or no information is provided.
Let q′i,Q (resp. q
′
i,∅) be the new waiting location selected
by driver i from Equation (1) with information Ii = Q (resp.
Ii = ∅). Let Fi = {q′i,Q, q′i,∅} be the set of candidate waiting
locations for driver i. If there exist i, j ∈ [m] such that q′i,Ii =
q′j,Ij , then we create a duplicate vertex u for q
′
j,Ij
such that
c(q′i,Ij , v) = c(u, v) for all v ∈ V . The formal definition of
the problem of sharing information with drivers is given as
follows:
Problem III.1. Consider a metric graph G = (∪mi=1Fi ∪
V,E, c). Find a new configuration Q′ by picking only one
vertex from each Fi, i.e., such that |Q′ ∩ Fi| = 1 for
each i, while minimizing the global objective D(Q′) =∑
u∈V minqi∈Q′ pa(u)c(q, u).
Figure 3 shows an instance of the information sharing
problem. The green vertices are the waiting locations of the
drivers if they have no information on the position of the
other drivers, and the red vertices are the waiting locations
of the drivers if the information is provided to each driver by
Fig. 3: An instance of Problem III.1. The green vertices represent
the desired waiting location of each driver if Ii = ∅, and the red
vertices represent the waiting location of the drivers if Ii = Q.
the service provider. Let Q′ be the solution to Problem III.1
in which if qi,Q ∈ Q′ then the driver i is provided complete
information of the position of the other drivers, and no
information is available for driver i if q′i,∅ ∈ Q′.
First, we analyze the complexity of Problem III.1, and then
we provide an LP-rounding algorithm to find the controls.
A. Proof of Hardness
We now prove the NP-hardness of Problem III.1 with a
reduction from CNF-SAT [18] as follows:
Consider an instance of CNF-SAT with n Boolean vari-
ables and m clauses. We will reduce this problem to Prob-
lem III.1.
(i) Let ∪mi=1Fi contain 2n vertices, partitioned into n
sets of size two. The set Fi contains two vertices,
{vTi , vFi }, where vTi will correspond to setting the ith
SAT variable to true (i.e., the positive literal) and vFi
will correspond to setting it to false (i.e., the negative
literal).
(ii) We let V contain m vertices, one representing each
clause in the SAT formula.
(iii) Let E contain an edge for each v ∈ ∪mi=1Fi and w ∈
V .
(iv) For each e = (v, w) ∈ E, we set its cost to 1 if the
literal v appears in the clause w, and 2 if the literal
does not. Note that the costs are metric.
(v) Let Pu = 1/m for each u ∈ V .
Now, we solve the instance of Problem III.1. If it returns
a subset of ∪mi=1Fi with cost exactly 1, then for each clause
c ∈ V , there is literal in ∪mi=1Fi with edge cost of 1 to c.
This implies that the literal chosen from each subset in the
partition of ∪mi=1Fi gives a satisfying truth assignment for
the SAT instance. If the subset returned has a cost greater
than 1, then there exists a clause w ∈ V for which every
chosen literal has edge cost of 2. Thus, this clause is not
satisfied and no satisfying instance exists.
B. Linear-Program Rounding Algorithm
Given that Problem III.1 is NP-hard, we turn our focus
to suboptimal algorithms. In particular, we provide a simple
Linear Program (LP)-rounding algorithm for Problem III.1.
Although we do not provide bound on the performance of
the LP-rounding algorithm, we evaluate the performance of
the algorithm on an extensive set of real-world ride sourcing
data in Section V and we show that the proposed algorithm
is on average within 0.014% of the optimal.
First we cast Problem III.1 as an integer linear program
(ILP), then we propose a rounding algorithm based on the
solution to the relaxation of the ILP. Let integer parameter
xu,v ∈ {0, 1} denote the assignment of a request at v to a
driver at vertex u if xu,v = 1, and xu,v = 0 otherwise. Let
the integer parameter yu ∈ {0, 1} for all u ∈ ∪mi Fi represent
if there is a driver assigned to wait for next request arrival
at u. Then we write the ILP for Problem III.1 as follows:
minimize
∑
v∈V
∑
u∈∪mi Fi
pa(v)c(u, v)xu,v (3)
subject to:
∑
u∈∪mi Fi
xu,v ≥ 1, ∀v ∈ V (4)
yu ≥ xu,v, ∀v ∈ V, u ∈ ∪mi Fi (5)
yu + yv = 1, Fi = {u, v}, i ∈ [m] (6)
yu, xu,v ∈ {0, 1}, ∀v ∈ V, u ∪mi Fi
By constraint (4), a feasible solution assigns each request
location to a driver. Equation (5) ensures that a request is
assigned to u only if there is a driver located at u, and finally
Equation (6) shows that in a feasible solution only one of
the candidate waiting locations is chosen from each subset
Fi, which represent that either the information is provided
to a driver or otherwise.
Now we propose our LP-rounding algorithm for Prob-
lem III.1. Let (x′,y′) be the solution to the LP relaxation of
ILP (3). Without loss of generality for all Fi = {u, v}, i ∈
[m], let yu ≥ 1/2 and yv ≤ 1/2. Given solution (x′,y′) we
construct an integer solution to ILP (3) by setting yu = 1
for each vertex u with y′u > 1/2 and yv = 0. In a case,
Fi = {u, v} and y′u = y′v = 1/2, we set yu = 1 where u is
the optimal waiting location of driver i with Ii = ∅. Then we
assign each vertex v ∈ V to the closest vertex u in ∪mi=1Fi
with yu = 1 by setting xu,v = 1. Note that the constructed
solution (x, y) satisfies the constraint of ILP (3), therefore,
it is a feasible solution to Problem III.1. Also, observe that
the optimal objective value to the LP relaxation is a lower-
bound on the optimal value of ILP (3) and provides a bound
on the performance of the LP-rounding algorithm.
In the solution to the information sharing problem, if driver
i is selected to receive information on the location of drivers,
a snapshot of the location of drivers is presented to driver
i and the driver can calculate their expected profit based
on complete information. This method employed at each
time step and presents information to a driver if there is
an opportunity to improve the expected response time.
The problem of information sharing indirectly controls
the configuration of the drivers by providing information to
a subset of them, however, the possible configurations are
limited to the candidate waiting locations of the drivers. In
the following section, we provide the details on the pay-
to-control method for the service provider to optimize the
global objective.
IV. PAY TO CONTROL
Each driver as a self-interested unit chooses its waiting lo-
cation by maximizing the profit in Equation (1). To convince
the vehicles to relocate to another configuration, the service
provider needs to compensate for the difference between their
expected profit of the new location and their expected profit
for the waiting location from Equation (1). First, we pose the
problem between the drivers and the service provider as a
game. Then we provide an approximation algorithm to find
the optimal policy for the service provider.
A. Service Provider’s Game
Let di be the incentive per unit distance offered to driver
i. Let Q = {q1, . . . , qm} (resp. Q′ = {q′1, . . . , q′m}) be the
configuration of the drivers before (resp. after) the incentive
pay. The game between the drivers and service provider
consists of the following:
• A set of m players and a service provider,
• An action set Ai for each driver i, which is the waiting
locations in the graph, i.e. Ai = V ∀i ∈ [m]. The action
set of the service provider is Q; and
• The profit function of the service provider is
h(Q′) =
∑
i∈m
diσc(qi, q
′
i) + βD(Q
′),
where β ≥ 0 is a user-defined parameter that indicates
the importance of the service quality for the service
provider with respect to the incentive pay. For a small
value of β, the incentive pay is in the priority, thus the
service provider will offer the waiting locations close to
the driver’s desired waiting location, however, for large
values of β, the service provider accepts high incentive
pay to relocate the drivers to the configuration with
minimum expected response time.
• The profit of driver i is the maximum of the expected
profit of the offered waiting location with incentive pay
and the expected profit of the waiting location from
Equation (1), i.e.,
max{(di − 1)σc(qi, q′i) + V(q′i, Bi − c(qi, q′i)),
max
u∈V
−σc(qi, u) + V(u,Bi − c(qi, u))}.
This is an instance of a leader-follower game [19]. The
service provider offers an incentive based on its utility and
the drivers as followers either take the offer or reject it.
The service provider is aware of the best action of the
drivers given any action taken by the service provider (i.e.,
incentive pay and the offered waiting location). The objective
is to find the optimal strategy for the service provider to
minimize a linear combination of the incentive pay and
the expected response time by relocating the drivers to the
desired configuration.
Driver i will accept the offer by the service provider to
relocate to q′i only if the offered incentives surpass the best-
expected profit of the driver. Since the profit functions of the
drivers are known to the service provider, then the minimum
di in which the drivers will accept the offer to move to
configuration Q′ is
di =
maxu∈V −σc(qi, u) + Vi(u,B − c(qi, u))
c(qi, q′i)
− Vi(q
′
i, Bi − c(qi, q′i))
σc(qi, q′i)
+ 1. (7)
In the equation above, maxu∈V −σc(qi, u) + Vi(u,B −
c(qi, u)) is the maximum expected profit of the driver i by
relocating to a new waiting location, and Vi(q′i, Bi−c(qi, q′i))
is the expected profit of driver i by waiting at the location
q′i offered by the service provider. Knowing this minimum
di, the objective of the service provider becomes
h(Q′) =
∑
i∈m
σc(qi, q
′
i) + β
∑
u∈V
pu min
i∈[m]
c(q′i, u) (8)
+
∑
i∈m
max
u∈V
−σc(qi, u) + Vi(u,B − c(qi, u))
−
∑
i∈m
Vi(q′i, Bi − c(qi, q′i)).
Observe that
∑
i∈m maxu∈V −σc(qi, u)+Vi(u,B−c(qi, u))
is independent of the optimization parameters. Therefore, the
problem of minimizing the utility function of the service
provider h has the mobile facility location (MFL) problem
as a special case where Vi(v,Bi − c(u, v)) = 0 for all
u, v ∈ V and i ∈ [m]. The MFL is a well-known NP-hard
problem [20] where given a metric graph G = (F ∪D,E, c),
mapping µ : D → R+ and a subset Q ⊆ F ∪D of size m.
The objective is to find a subset Q′ = {q′1, . . . , q′m} ⊆ F
minimizing
∑
i∈[m] c(qi, q
′
i) +
∑
u∈D µu minq′∈Q′ c(u, q
′).
Remark IV.1 (Equilibrium). The optimal solution to the prob-
lem minQ′ h(Q′) is the equilibrium of the leader-follower
game between the service provider and the drivers. Since
any other configuration will increase the cost function of the
service provider. In addition, By Equation (7), waiting in a
location other than the one suggested by the service provider
will decrease driver’s expected profit.
B. Approximation Algorithm
We now propose a constant factor approximation for
the minimum pay-to-control problem, namely minimizing
Equation (8). Let wq′i,Ii =
1
σ maxu∈V σc(qi, u)−Vi(u,B −
c(qi, u)) + V (q
′
i, Bi − c(qi, q′i)), then the utility function of
the service provider becomes
h(Q′) =
∑
i∈[m]
(
c(qi, q
′
i)− wq′i,Ii
)
+ β
∑
u∈V
pa(u) min
i∈[m]
c(q′i, u).
The algorithm follows by a reduction from the minimum
pay-to-control problem to MFL.
Given an instance of the minimum pay-to-control problem
we construct an MFL instance as follows:
(i) A graph G = (Q∪F ∪V,E, c′) where F is the set of
possible waiting locations for the drivers
(ii) There is an edge between qi ∈ Q and q′ ∈ F with cost
c′(qi, q′) = c(qi, q′)− wq′,Ii ,
(iii) There is an edge between q′ ∈ F and v ∈ V with cost
c′(q′, v) = c(q′, v).
Fig. 4: Constructed MFL instance for optimizing the utility of the
service provider. An instance of the edges between the subsets is
shown with their respective costs.
(iv) The objective is to find a set of m vertices in F such
that minimizes
C(Q′) =
∑
i∈m
c′(qi, q′i) + β
∑
u∈V
pa(u) min
i∈[m]
c′(q′i, u).
Figure 4 shows a schematic representation of the constructed
MFL instance. Suppose Q′ is a solution to the MFL instance,
we let Q′ be the solution of the minimum pay-to-control
problem and provide the following result on the cost of the
solution.
Lemma IV.2. Given an α-approximation algorithm for
the MFL problem, the reduction above provides an α-
approximation for the minimum pay-to-control problem.
Proof. For any Q′ ⊆ F , by the construction of the MFL
instance, we have h(Q′) = σC(Q′). Therefore, given an
α-approximation algorithm for the MFL problem, and Q′
obtained from the constructed MFL instance, we select
Q′ as a solution to the minimum pay-to-control problem.
Therefore,
h(Q′) = σC(Q′) ≤ ασ min
Q∗⊆F
C(Q∗) = α min
Q∗⊆F
h(Q∗).
By the result of Lemma IV.2, the 3 + o(1)-approximation
algorithm for the MFL problem in [20] applies to the
minimum pay-to-control problem.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of the two proposed indirect
controls on ride-sourcing data from Uber [21]. The data set
consists of the pick-up time and locations from April to
September 2014 in New York City, primarily Manhattan. The
jammed scenario occurs frequently with high demand in an
area and especially when surge price is applied for the high
demand area [2], [3].
To reduce the complexity of the large data set with 914
pick-up locations, we cluster the close pick-up locations into
125 clusters such that no two pick-up locations in a cluster
are farther than 500 meters apart. The drop-off location for
each ride is selected from the same set of clusters with equal
probability. Figure 5 shows the clustered pick-up locations
and the arrival rates for ride requests at each cluster is
Fig. 5: The set of pick-up and drop off locations in Manhattan N.Y.
The bar at the location of each cluster represents the ride request
arrival rate.
represented with a bar. The performance of the proposed
control methods are evaluated in two scenarios: 1) the initial
location of the drivers are selected uniformly randomly, and
2) jammed scenario where the drivers are initialized at 20
closest locations to the Rockefeller center in Manhattan.
Observe that the proposed algorithms to find the controls
are applicable to various driver models for V . In the follow-
ing section, we propose a behavior model V for the drivers.
A. Drivers’ model
A driver model is a process of evaluating the expected
profit of different locations at each time instance. Prior to
introducing our driver model, we provide the parameters in
the proposed model.
The pick-up probability of a location v as seen by driver i
is the probability that a ride-request at v is assigned to driver
i before any other ride request. Consider a configuration Q
of the drivers and a vertex u, where driver i is the kth
closest driver to the vertex location u. Since a request is
assigned to the closest available driver, then driver i can
expect to be assigned to the kth request arriving at u. Let
Si(v, u) denote the number of drivers closer to v than driver
i located at vertex u. Note that Si(v, u) is a function of
the information of driver i regarding the position of other
drivers. Figure 6 illustrates an instance with three vehicles
and a pick-up location. Given the full information of the
vehicle positions, Sred at pick-up location is 2 and Sred is
zero if Ired = ∅.
The probability that a request at v is assigned to driver i
located at u as expected by driver i before any other request
is approximated by
pi(v, u) = Πw∈V
Si(v,u)+Si(w,u)+1∑
k=Si(v,u)+1
(∑
w∈V Si(w, u) + 1
k
)
( λv
λv + λw
)k( λw
λv + λw
)Si(v,u)+Si(w,u)+1−k
.
Let σ′ be the fare per unit time of servicing a request,
(a) Ired = Q (b) Ired = ∅
Fig. 6: Environment with three drivers and a pick-up location v. (a)
The red car has full information on the position of the other drivers,
therefore, Sred(v, qred) = 2 , (b) The positions of the other drivers
are not known to the driver of red car, thus, Sred(v, qred) = 0.
then the profit of a ride with pick-off at v and drop-off at w
for driver i located at u is σ′c(w, v)− σc(u, v).
Now we define the expected profit of driver i located at
u and working for Bi period of time as follows:
Vi(u,Bi) =
∑
v,w∈V
pd(w|v)
[
pi(v, u)
(
max{0, σ′c(w, v) (9)
− σc(u, v) + Vi(w,Bi − c(u, v)− c(v, w))}
)]
,
where Vi(u, 0) = 0 for all u ∈ V , drivers i ∈ [m] and
Ii ⊆ Q. Note that, Vi(w,Bi−c(u, v)−c(v, w)) represents the
expected profit of driver i after drop-off at w. The conditional
probability of the drop-off location is the common knowledge
of the drivers and the ride-sourcing companies based on prior
customer data.
Intuitively, the expected profit in Equation (9) represents
the total expected profit of servicing requests with pick-up
location at v and drop-offs at w only if the
σ′c(w, v)− σc(u, v) + Vi(w,Bi − c(u, v)− c(v, w)) ≥ 0.
Observe that finding Vi(u,Bi) for all u ∈ V and a given Bi
is performed in polynomial time, however, since the drivers
are not going through the calculation of Vi(u,Bi) for all
u ∈ V , we assume that they have access to the expected
profit of the vertices by experience.
Since the calculation of the expected profit for drivers
for each time step is computationally expensive, we trained
a Random Forest Regressor [22] implemented by [23] to
approximate the values of V for each number of vehicles
in the system with training data over 10000 instances with
work-day Bi of 5 average length rides, fare σ′ = $1.06 per
mile and driving cost σ = $0.3 [24].
B. Partial Information Sharing
Figure 7 shows the percentage improvement in the ex-
pected response time for different number of vehicles using
the partial information sharing control method of Section III
in the two scenarios. Observe that as the number of drivers
increases, the average improvement in the expected response
time increases. However, with a large number of drivers
randomly placed in the environment, the expected response
time decreases and the possibility to further optimize it with
information sharing is limited. On the other hand, in the
jammed scenario where the drivers are concentrated in an
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Fig. 7: Improvement in expected response time by sharing location
information.
area, the information sharing method improves the expected
response time by 10% on average. The information sharing
method shares information on the position of the other
drivers with 31.0% and 41.7% of the drivers in the random
initial configuration and jammed scenarios, respectively. The
results are the average of 1000 instances for different number
of drivers and scenarios. The boxes show the first, first and
third quartiles of each set of experiments. The expected
response time of the solution obtained from the LP-rounding
algorithm of Section III on this set of experiments is within
0.014% on average of the solution of the LP relaxation of the
information sharing problem. The maximum deviation from
the optimal solution of the LP relaxation is 0.42%.
Figure 8 shows the expected response time of a set of
20 drivers responding to 100 requests arriving over time
with the jammed initial configuration. In this experiment,
the maximum arrival rate on the vertices is 0.03 per minute,
therefore, we assumed that there exist enough time to relo-
cate between the ride request arrivals. Note that the partial
information method maintains a low expected response time
over the course of responding to 100 requests compared to
the same set of drivers with no control input on their waiting
locations. The results are an average of 100 experiments with
100 randomly generated requests for each experiment. The
lines represent the average and shaded areas represent the
first and third quartiles.
C. Pay to Control
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the PAY-
TO-CONTROL method for the two scenarios. Figure 9 il-
lustrates the improvement in the expected response (solid
lines) time and the total amount paid to the drivers (dashed
lines) to relocate for different β values in the random initial
configuration scenario. The shaded area represents the first
and third quartiles of 1000 random instances for each number
of vehicles. The amount paid is proportional to the average
cost of riding UberXL, i.e., $0.3 per minute [24]. For larger
β, the expected response time is more important than the
amount paid for relocation. Therefore, with a larger number
of vehicles, the PAY-TO-CONTROL method increases the
amount paid to the drivers to minimize the expected response
time. Notice that with β = 10 the expected response time
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Fig. 8: The expected response time of a system of 20 drivers
executing 100 ride requests arriving over time under the partial
information control method. The drivers are initialized under the
jammed scenario.
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Fig. 9: The percentage improvement in expected response time and
the incentive pay. The solid lines represent the average improvement
in the expected response time and the dashed lines represent the
total amount paid to the drivers.
has improved by 25% for $1 per driver.
Next, we evaluate the performance of the pay-to-control
algorithm in the jammed scenario. Figure 10 shows that with
a larger number of vehicles concentrated in a small area,
the pay-to-control algorithm improves the expected response
time significantly with limited amounts paid to the drivers.
Notice that with β = 10 the expected response time has
improved by 70% for $2 per driver.
Figure 11 shows the expected response time and the
amount paid to a set of 20 drivers responding to 100 requests
arriving over time with the jammed initial configuration.
Notice that the PAY-TO-CONTROL method with β = 1
maintains a low expected response time over the course of
responding to 100 requests compared to the same set of
drivers with no control input on their waiting locations. The
total amount paid to the drivers over the course of responding
to 100 requests is $1.87 per request. The results are an
average of 100 experiments with 100 randomly generated
requests for each experiment. The lines represent the average
and shaded areas represent the first and third quartiles.
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Fig. 10: The percentage improvement in the expected response
time and the incentive pay in the jammed scenario. The solid lines
represent the average improvement in the expected response time
and the dashed lines represent the total amount paid to the drivers.
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Fig. 11: The expected response time and the paid amount to a
system of 20 drivers executing 100 ride requests arriving over time
under the PAY-TO-CONTROL method. The drivers are initialized
under the jammed scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper considered the problem of controlling self-
interested drivers in ride-sourcing applications. Two indirect
control methods were proposed and for each, a near-optimal
algorithm was presented. The extensive results show signif-
icant improvement in the expected response time on real-
world ride-sourcing data. In addition, we hope to extend the
results to capture vehicles with different capacities and ride-
sharing applications.
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